Relation of Natural to Positive Law by Marceau, Leroy
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 2
9-1-1942
Relation of Natural to Positive Law
Leroy Marceau
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leroy Marceau, Relation of Natural to Positive Law, 18 Notre Dame L. Rev. 22 (1942).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol18/iss1/2
THE RELATION OF NATURAL TO POSITIVE LAW
IN GENERAL. The distemper of modem legal -philosophy
may be traced in large part to a lack of precision in the ideas
advanced by its several schools. The literature of the subject
abounds in such terms as "tendency" and "approach," and
such phrases as "laws which may be broken," "ought propo-
sitions" and even "law stuff." While a great deal of this may
be unavoidable in the present state of human knowledge, the
situation has nonetheless prevented the formulation of defi-
nite issues (between conflicting theories) and has made it
difficult for the theories themselves to be experimentally
tested. In this brief essay, we shall attempt to set forth what
we consider the most convenient definitions of two ele-
mentary terms, positive law and natural law, attempting to
employr language sufficiently definite to indicate the extent
to which the two laws are similar and the precise way in
which they differ. Only by doing this can we hope to draw
the issue between them, and to simplify the study of in-
stances in which the contents of the two laws conflict - the
so-called problem of "unjust" positive law.
Let us begin on a modest scale. Instead of attempting at
the outset to formulate a definition of "law," either natural
or positive, it is preferable to limit, ourselves to the study of
a simple "right-duty" relationship, as the term is employed
in the Hohfeld system of legal analysis. For many purposes
the word "claim," suggested by Kocourek, would be prefer-
able to the word "right". But because "right" is a term
equally at home either in positive or in natural law, whereas
"claim" has been confined predominantly to discussions of
positive law alone, the Hohfeld terminology will be used in
this discussion. We shall therefore endeavor to distinguish
a positive or "jural" right (as the term appears in positive
law) from the corresponding "natural" right (as the term
appears in natural law).
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A "right" itself, whether appearing in the positive or in
the natural law, may be defined as a legal authority to
require a positive or negative act of another person. It is, of
course, elementary that the other person is under a correla-
tive "duty" to perform the act in question at the behest of
the holder of the right; and that the entire concept "right-
duty" is one indivisible relationship. Nevertheless, for our
present purposes, it will suffice to consider the relationship
solely from the standpoint of the "right." Proceeding from
the definition of a "right" in general, we shall endeavor to
suggest the most convenient criteria by which the genus
"right" may be subdivided into species and, specifically, by
which some Tights may be classed as positive or "jural" while
others are classed as "natural."
THE DISTINCTION PROPOSED. We have defined a right as
an authority to require a positive or a negative act of an-
other person. The meaning of this definition can be better
understood if we recall John Dewey's observation "a thing
is what it does," and endeavor to see how a right actually
operates in practice. Let us consider, for example, a typical
right of property, the right of the owner of a marble statue
to insist that a non-owner leave the statue alone. This right
means that if the non-owner violates his duty and, let us say,
destroys the statue, he will be penalized and the owner will
be compensated. In the beautiful language of Justice Holmes
"A legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a
man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in
this or that way...; and so of a legal right." '
Now ,the foregoing description of a right is applicable to
any right, whether jural, natural or otherwise.' It is submit-
ted that the true distinction between the various classes of
rights will be found to turn upon the way in which the pre-
1 "Collected Legal Papers" by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., (1920) at page 169.
2 It is true that Holmes, in the foregoing quotation, was discussing jural rights,
as also in his famous statement: "What the courts do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious is what I mean by law (italics supplied)." But the reasoning is of gen-
eral applicability.
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dicted consequences come about, i. e., the type of sanction
which operates if the right is violated. For example, if the
non-owner of the statute, upon violating his duty and de-
stroying the statue, will be punished by the state, then the
right in question is a positive or "jural" right. If he will be
punished by the operation of an invariant principle in nature
(under which merit always finds its proper reward) then
the right in question is a "natural" right. There are, of
course, many other possible types of "right," but these two,
jural and natural, are of such unique importance that we
will confine ourselves to them in the more detailed discus-
sions which follow.
A NATURAL RIGHT. We have described a natural right as
a right sanctioned by a uniform way in which, in nature,
certain human acts are always followed by certain effects. It
is a law of cause and effect, like any other, except that its
terms are not confined to volumes, masses and such like
physical qualities, but contain also the mental qualities,
volition and preference. Of course, whatever relationship
actually exists between act and effect is the natural right.
But the regnant theory of natural rights tends to teach
rather definitely what the relationship is. It teaches, for ex-
ample, that human exertion and sacrifice will, inevitably, be
accompanied by an increased state of well-being or, in other
words, by the satisfaction of a larger proportion of one's
preferences. Philosophers of a mathematical turn of mind
have suggested that one's ultimate well-being is proportioned-
to his exertion with the exactness of an algebraic equation,
under a principle which preserves the result of every volition
as inexorably as the influence of every physical atom is pre-
served by the "law of substance" or the principle of the
conservation of mass and energy. Indeed, these two laws
(the material world exhibiting the one, and the other oper-
ating in the mental) have been considered as altogether
parallel principles which have perhaps a common origin and
may even, in some future coup of science, be resolved into a
higher unity. Both serve to outlaw the element of chance
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and, by confirming the regularity of all nature, carry to its
furthest development our human confidence in the perfect
order of the World.
The argument for the existence of such a principle in the
moral world is advanced by its proponent in much the same
manner as Helmholtz argued for the acceptance of the
physical law of substance. Experience seems to confirm it
where it can be tested, and thus suggests its acceptance even
where it cannot be tested. It is an inductive proposition.
Thus it is pointed out that individuals who injure their
neighbors are beset by fear, by remorse, and by ill fortune
in unrelated matters; 3 and that individuals who do good
meet with inward satisfaction, outward acclaim, and by good
fortune in many ways. The wholehearted acceptance of this
belief by the average man is sufficiently proved by the obser-
vation that no theatrical production or work of literature in
which the villain triumphed would be thought of for a mo-
ment as true to life. Examples of the acceptance of this belief
in intellectual circles are endless;' and on at least one occa-
3 The positive law itself is, of course, a part of nature, and therefore one of
the factors which operate in the enforcement of natural relations.
4 "He who wishes to secure the good of others has already secured his own."
-Confucius.
"Pain is the outcome of Sin."--Buddha.
"No evil is without its compensation. -The less money, the less trouble, -the
less favor, the less envy. -Even in those cases which put us out of wits, it is not
the loss itself, but -the estimate of the loss that troubles us"-Seneca.
"All advantages are attended with disadvantages. -A universal compensation
prevails in all conditions of being and existence."--Hume.
"Fear follows crime, and is its punishment."--Voltaire.
"When fate has allowed to any man more than one great gift, accident or neces-
sity seems usually to contrive that one shall encumber and impede the other."
-Swinburne.
"Guilt, though it may attain temporal splendor, can never confer real happiness.
The evident consequences of our crimes long survive their commission, and, like the
ghosts of the murdered, forever haunt the steps of the malefactor.'--Walter Scott.
"Though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceedingly small.'"--F.
Von Logan in "Retribution" (translated by Longfellow).
" hen Infinite wisdom established the rule of right and honesty, he saw to it
that justice should always be the highest expediency."--Wendell Phillips.
"Whatever difference may appear in the fortunes of mankind, there is, neverthe-
less, a certain compensation of good and evil which makes them equal."--Roche-
foucauld.
Such references occur in the Bible almost without number. The following are
probably best known to the general reader: "He that diggeth a pit, shall fall into
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sion it has been compared to the principle of contradiction.'
Even where it seems to fail, as in the case of tragedy, its
proponents argue that in reality -the fault lies in the uncom-
pleteness of our observations.
The old physical law of conservation of mass, and its
counterpart, the law of conservation of energy, were origi-
nally formulated under the impression that the world of
mass had been sharply divided from that of energy, so that
neither substance could be transmuted into the other. But
when this seeming isolation of the two material worlds was
shattered by the discovery that mass can be converted into
energy and can in turn reappear when the energy is spent,
the two laws lost their independent validity and became
merged in a more profound principle of truth. In much the
same way, modern students of ethics are beginning to sus-
pect that while there is, in this existence, a rough principle
of compensation by which men tend to meet their just
reward, still this principle is imperfect, like the old law of
mass. To formulate the correct principle we must look also
to a future existence, a world of reward and punishment
which keys in with our present world of good and evil. The
two states, taken together, make possible a completeness of
life which neither by itself contains, and furnish a system in
which the natural law can be observed in all its meticulous
exactness.
There is, however, a very respectable body of opinion
which argues that natural law, as we have defined it, does
not exist; that not only is there no exact principle propor-
tioning man's well-being to his voluntary exertions, but that
it: and he that rolleth a stone, it shall return to him." Proverbs xxxvi, 27. "They
shall sow wind, and reap a whirlwind." Hosea viii, 7. "All those who take the sword
will perish by the sword." Matt. xxvi, 52. "What a man sows, that he will also
reap." Gal. vi, 8. And note the famous comment of Saint Paul with further refer-
ence to this topic, "Now he who plants and he who waters are one, yet each will
receive his own reward according to his labor." 1 Cor. iii, 8.
5 "It is as impossible for a man to be cheated by anyone but himself, as for a
thing to be, and not to be, at the same time." From "Compensation," by Ralph
Waldo Emerson.
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there is no such principle of any kind - at least no such
principle of sufficient cofistancy to serve as a practical guide.
This point of view is shared apparently by many legal posi-
tivists and by some members of the modern school of legal
realism. It does not deny thatthere are certain physical laws
of cause and effect which correlate human acts (and thereby
the human individual) with physical nature; but it does
deny, apparently that there is any such correlation of
mental elements such as volition and preference. The impli-
cations of this viewpoint we shall consider hereafter.
Assuming for the moment that an invariant principle does
exist, proportioning man's well-being to his exertions, let us
consider its operation in practice. Under -this principle a
sculptor who exerts himself through labor and toil to pro-
duce a work of art, let us say a marble statue, may confi-
dently expect to have a greater proportion of his preferences
satisfied than will be the case of a stranger who does nothing.
Therefore, when a question arises concerning the disposition
of the completed statue, if it is disposed of in accordance
with the preferences of the sculptor rather than in accord-
ance with the preference of the stranger, the expected has
happened and no repercussions are to be anticipated. But if,
on the contrary, the stranger disposes of the statue in accord-
ance with his own preference rather than the preference of
the sculptor, the sculptor will be compensated in some other
way and the stranger will be penalized. This is expressed in
legal terminology by saying that the sculptor has a natural
right that the stranger should not interfere with the statue.
THE POSITION OF THE EXTREME SCHOLASTIC. The doc-
trine of natural law, as set forth in the preceding paragraph,
will probably meet with the approval of the great majority
among those who adhere to the scholastic point of view. But
scholasticism normally goes a step further and attempts to
explain why the natural law exists. It teaches that the natu-
ral law has come about as follows: The Deity has bestowed
certain rights upon the individual man, and has promul-
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gated certain commands in order to secure the observance
of these rights.' These commands are said to be "binding in
conscience" in the sense that they impose an "ought" rela-
tion altogether apart from and independent of any sanction
which may enforce them.
One need not at all dissent from the truth of this position
to argue that it contributes nothing to our understanding of
natural law - that it is, on the contrary, somewhat confus-
ing.' Granted that the Deity may be the author of natural
law, He must be considered equally the Author of all natu-
ral constants, e. g., the law of gravitation and the Newtonian
laws of motion. All laws of nature, whether physical or
moral, stand at last on the same footing. Religion will argue
that the Deity is the Author of all; while non-believers will
purport to find the common source in mysterious "world
forces," or not at all. But no one will argue that the Deity
supports the moral law in some way separate and distinct
from the way in which He supports physical law. And if the
Deity supports both laws, why stress His participation in the
moral law?
It is impossible not to pause here to suggest that natural
law theory stands to benefit if it refrains from any contro-
versy as to how the natural law comes to be.8 When origi-
nally promulgated by Aristotle, and even when put into final
form by St. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century,
natural law theory was handicapped by the limited develop-
6 "From psychology and theodicy, Natural Law took over as postulates the
existence of a creator, a rational spiritual soul, consciousness and free will. - - - Man
is thus de jure and free. He has certain fundamental duties and rights given him by
God which no man has a right to destroy."--"Natural Law and Legal Realism"
by Francis E. Lucey, S.J., Georgetown Law Journal, April 194Z. Volume 30, No. 6,
Page 524.
7 "-in considering objectively what a thing is in itself, it may be of the ut-
most importance to know where it came from and the manner in which it is re-
vealed to us. But it would be helpful to clear thinking if these matters were dis-
cussed separately and excluded from the definition."--"Natural Law in American
Jurisprudence," by William P. Sternberg, 13 Notre Dame Lawyer 89, January 1938.
8 "The rule of dramatic poetry, not to introduce a God upon the stage unless
a crisis appears demanding the Divine intervention, should be the rule of philosophy
also:
Nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vendice nadus incideri."-"Law, Its Origin, Growth
and Function," by James Carter Coolidge, page 175.
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ment of science which then obtained. Law, as the derivation
of the word suggests,9 was thought of as something laid
down by authority - something imposed in the same way
upon matter 1 0 and upon man. Since then the classic observa-
tion of David Hume (1711-1776) has taught us that experi-
ence is limited to the orderly progression of events, and can-
not discern the ultimate forces or powers which lie behind
phenomena. This lesson has been taken to heart in the physi-
cal sciences where -the old concept of force is now completely
overthrown. It has been taken to heart, too, within the last
fifty years, by some few exponents of the positive law. And
it can be safely trusted to deal fairly with natural law. 1 '
A JuI AL RIGHT. We have described a jural right as a
right sanctioned by the uniformity with which the State
attaches certain consequences to certain acts. For example, if
a stranger were to destroy the statue, which we have been
employing in our illustration, the state would require him to
pay to the sculptor a sum of money equal to the statue in
value. This is expressed in legal terminology by saying that
the sculptor has a "jural right" that the stranger shall not
destroy the statue.
9 From the Greek word lego, to lay. Later forms are the Latin lex, and the
Anglo Saxon lecgan.
10 "The 'laws of nature', by those who first used the term in this sense, were
viewed as commands imposed by the Deity upon matter, and even writers who do
not accept this view often speak of them as 'obeyed' by the phenomena, or as
agents by which the phenomena are produced."-The Oxford Dictionary, Volume
6, Page 115, Law, 17.
11 The failure of natural law to take the lead in this development seems to lie
largely in the history of human thought. In the antique world laws were thought
of as uniformities imposed by power. The laws of natural science were thought to
be imposed upon matter by mysterious "forces" of nature, the positive law was
thought to be imposed upon men by a sovereign, and the moral law was thought
of as a set of rules imposed by God. Of course no one really believed that these
three phenomena were really supported by separate powers. But the moral law,
being developed by religious teachers, naturally stressed the authority of God,
while the positive law stressed -the more immediate authority of the state.
After David Hume pointed out, in 1740, that ultimate causes are not discover-
able by experience, natural science ceased to concern itself with them since they
cannot be subjected to its tools; religion continued to emphasize them, because of
their undoubted existence and importance. Positive law, finding itself between two
conflicting points of view, has had great difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory com-
promise.
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There is no dispute as to how jural rights are sanctioned,
because the machinery of the state is in the ordinary instance
direct and obvious; nor is there any serious body of opinion
which would argue that jural rights do not exist. Sporadic
attacks on the "certainty" of positive law are in effect
attacks upon its existence; for of course the essence of law
is uniformity, and complete uncertainty would be complete
absence of all law."2 But no sustained argument of this sort
has appeared in the last decade.'3
THE WEAKNESS OF POSITIVIST THEORY. There is little
that can be said in opposition to positive law. It seems clearly
to exist, and while it may not be as far reaching as some
might wish, may be somewhat uncertain in its statement and
inconsistent in its provisions, it is yet theoretically impreg-
nable. If the proponents of positive law were to rest here,
they might rest beyond the reach of controversy.
There is, however, a 'tendency among them to go further
and actually enter the lists against natural law. Kelsen, for
example, considers justice an "irrational ideal"' 4 and prac-
tically calls natural law "a wishfulfilling fantasy;" "5 and
Holmes states with consummate honesty, "The jurists who
believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive state
of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted
12 "For complete uncertainty in law differs little from the absence of all law."
-"The Science of Law," by Sheldon Amos (1896) Page 62.
3 The last such attack of any consequence was probably advanced by Jerome
Frank in his controversial book "Law and the Modern Mind" which appeared at
the dose of the 1920's. There Justice Frank seemed to take the position that there
was practically no uniformity in existing positive law.
14 "The Pure Theory of Law" by Hans Kelsen, 50 Law Quarterly Review
474, 482 (October 1934). And note how Kelsen, along with others, with telling ef-
fect, argues that because natural laws have not been formulated in detail, they do
not exist. This was the argument used against chemistry before Lavoisier and
against astronomy before Newton. It is an argument of great apparent power. See
"The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence" by Hans Kelsen, 55 Har-
vard Law Review, 44, 47 (November, 1941). "But none of the numerous natural
law theories has so far succeeded in defining the content of this just order in a way
even approaching the exactness and objectivity with which natural science can de-
termine the content of the physical laws of nature, or jurisprudence the content of
any given positive legal order."
15 "The Law as a Specific Social Technique" by Hans Kelsen, 9 University of
Chicago Law Review 75, 78. (December, 1941).
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by them and their neighbors as something that must be ac-
cepted by all men everywhere." 10 Nor do these authorities
stand alone. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that legal
positivism, legal realism, the pure theory of law and perhaps
all recent theories generally, have been associated in practice
with the active denial of natural law. And therein lies their
great weakness: For it leads them inescapably to the doc-
trine that might makes right. It is quite clear that a jural
right or duty is simply a statement as to what the state will
do to individuals if they act thus and so, and that the state
in turn is simply our fellow human beings 17 acting jointly,
and therefore acting as the majority or the dominant group
desire. These considerations show that the content of posi-
tive law depends upon the will of the majority and upon
nothing else."8 When the majority changes its mind, or when
physical power shifts from one group to another, the positive
law changes. No objective criterion, no standard of merit,1"
can stand in the way."0 It is just the expression of might
and, as such, is indistinguishable from tyranny.
Thus there is no denying that in Warsaw today (1942) it
is the jural right of Aryan citizens to heap untold indignities
upon those of Polish blood; and it is the jural duty of Poles
1' "Collected Legal Papers," by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Page 312.
17 "Why do we feel at liberty sometimes to denounce a regularly enacted
statute as wrong, tyrannical, and unjust? It is because it is but the product of the
will of one or a few men, and is liable to be affected by the ignorance, passion, and
error to which their judgments are subject." "Law, Its Origin, Growth and Func-
tion," by James Carter Coolidge, Page 159.
18 "-when it comes to the development of a corpus juris the ultimate ques-
tion is what do the dominant forces of the community want and do they want it
hard enough to disregard whatever inhibitions may stand in the way."--"Book
Notices, Uncollected Letters and Papers" by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1936)
page 187.
19 "1 suppose, in the mind of men, the idea of a supreme law that attaches
happiness to virtue, unhappiness to crime. Omit the idea of this law, and the judg-
ment of merit and demerit is without foundation."--"Lectures on The True, The
Beautiful, and the Good," by M. V. Cousin, at Page 320.
20 Note how all standards are expressly repudiated by a great positivist. "Our
morality seems to me only a check on the ultimate domination of force-. When
the Germans in the late war disregarded what we called the rules of the game, I
don't see there was anything to be said except: we don't like it and shall kill you
if we can."--"Book Notices, Uncollected Letters and Papers" by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, 187 (1936).
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to submit. This is the positive law. Were an order to be pro-
mulgated in Berlin, making citizenship depend upon the
killing of a Jew, that, too, would be the law: And it would be
perfectly valid in every sense.2 If there be no natural law,
it is not even unwise for a dominant race to legislate away
the property and life of a subject people. It may be, on the
contrary, the obvious measure of enlightened self-interest.
Quite understandably, these conclusions (which follow
irresistably from a denial of natural law) shock the consci-
ence of the civilized world. And there is no escape from them.
It signifies very little to point out that individual scholars,
although denying the existence of natural law, privately sup-
port ideas of justice, of mercy, and even generosity. The fact
remains that their doctrines (if logically pursued) would lead
to a law of the jungle, - to the very worst examples of those
arbitrary forms of government which now rear their heads in
central Europe. The failure of the extreme positivists to pur-
sue their belief to that point betrays a weakness in their faith.
Their hesitation belies their doctrines; but it doesn't redeem
it. The hands are "the hands of Esau," though the voice may
yet speak as "the voice of Jacob."
THE MEANING OF UNJUST LAW. But suppose that the
proponents of positive law and the proponents of natural
law were each content to lay aside the controversial
factors which have been ingrafted on their respective
doctrines. Suppose that the positivists were to drop their
attack on natural law and to admit that individuals who
do "right" (i.e., enhance the well-being of their fellow men)
really receive a proportionate reward by the inexorable op-
eration of an invariant natural rule. Suppose, too, that the
Scholastics were to be satisfied with this concession, and were
21 For a contrary opinion see "Natural Law and Legal Realism" by Francis
E. Lucey, S.J., Georgetown Law Journal, April 1932, Volume 30, No. 6, Page 515.
"While the realists' theory demands that all law is completely and absolutely
changeable, because there are no ultimate objective values or norms, I doubt that
any of them would say that at some time in the future murder, arson, fraud, slan-
der, etc., would be, or could be, pre-requisites for citizenship."
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content with the fact of natural law without insisting upon
imputing it to any source, Divine or otherwise. What then
would be the relationship of natural to positive law?
It will be helpful here to proceed by considering an illus-
tiation, perhaps again the case of the sculptor who creates a
valuable statue out of a worthless piece of stone and thereby
acquires a natural right to control it. Let us assume that a
tyrannical state, instead of enacting a similar right in the
positive law, decrees that the statue is to belong to another,
perhaps a favorite of the dominant race, and that the sculp-
tor, instead of a jural right over the statue, is to have a duty
not to touch it. What is the legal result of this decree? It is
submitted that both the natural law and the positive law may
operate without conflict.22 The pampered favorite will obtain
the statue, just as the positive law decrees, or he will obtain
damages in its stead: But under the natural law the sculptor
will be compensated, and the favorite will be curbed, in the
timeless phrase of Adam Smith "as by an unseen hand" in
unexpected ways.
While the positive law will be valid and will be strictly car-
ried out, it will fail in its purpose. For the state, in awarding
the statue to its favorite, was in reality attempting to aug-
ment his well-being at the expense of the sculptor. And this,
because of the natural law, it could not accomplish. Thus the
action of the state is ultimately futile, a waste of effort, the
vain and pointless pursuit of an illusion. "Unjust" laws .are
therefore 'simply "unwise" laws, laws which are written in
ignorance of one of the immutable constants in the nature of
the world. They fail just as any other undertaking, of the
22 For a contrary conception of natural law, see "The Adequacy of Scholastic
Idealism," by William Steinberg, 20 Nebraska Law Review 317, 326, September
1941. "According to the natural law view, there are some moral precepts which do
have the force of law; consequently the binding character of a statute may some-
times be determined by companying the 'is' of the statute with the 'ought' of the
moral law. To the positivists on the other hand, the rules of morality are 'merely'
precepts, not law; consequently the binding character of any enactment can never
in any way depend on its content. A statute may be law, no matter how flagrantly
it violates the rules of moral conduct."
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state or of an individual, must fail if it runs counter to an
invariant principle. It is precisely the case of the proverbial
man who attempts to lift himself by tugging at his boot
straps. He may indeed exert a pull greater than his weight,
but his purpose is defeated because, in the language of New-
ton's third law of motion (a law, incidentally, which has a
familiar counterpart in the natural law) an "equal and op-
posite reaction" increases his apparent weight by the same
amount.
CONCLUSION. To sum up, we may say that the great
weakness in juristic "positivism," as that doctrine is ex-
pounded by its more aggressive proponents, lies in its dog-
matic assumption that (aside from the accomplishments of
positive law itself) there is no invariant principle of nature
under which one's actions inevitably draw upon one such con-
sequences as they merit.
The corresponding weakness of scholasticism in America
today seems to be an unwillingness to admit that such an in-
variant principle of nature (which it invariably champions
under the name of natural law) is no different from any other
invariant principle of nature in the physical sciences; that in
no sense is it any more dependent upon Divine support.
There is a great advantage to be gained -by viewing every
claim, as Justice Holmes viewed jural relations, simply as a
situation in which "if a man does or omits certain things he
will be made to suffer in this or that way." If he will be made
to suffer by the state, the relation is "jural"; if by an in-
variant principle of nature, the relation is "natural."
Under a doctrine of this sort, the ancient problem as to the
validity of positive law (when it conflicts with natural law)
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resolves itself. Both relations remain valid in the sense that
both exist, and will be carried out in full. But the purpose
which the state seeks to accomplish by means of the jural
relation will necessarily fail; so that the jural relation, though
entirely valid, becomes unwise and futile, like a statute which
attempts to ignore the principle of supply and demand or the
law of gravity.
Leroy Marceau.
